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Abstract—A graph-based sampling and consensus (GraphSAC)
approach is introduced to effectively detect anomalous nodes in
large-scale graphs. Existing approaches rely on connectivity and
attributes of all nodes to assign an anomaly score per node. How-
ever, nodal attributes and network links might be compromised
by adversaries, rendering these holistic approaches vulnerable.
Alleviating this limitation, GraphSAC randomly draws subsets
of nodes, and relies on graph-aware criteria to judiciously filter
out sets contaminated by anomalous nodes, before employing
a semi-supervised learning (SSL) module to estimate nominal
label distributions per node. These learned nominal distributions
are minimally affected by the anomalous nodes, and hence can
be directly adopted for anomaly detection. Rigorous analysis
provides performance guarantees for GraphSAC, by bounding
the required number of draws. The per-draw complexity grows
linearly with the number of edges, which implies efficient SSL,
while draws can be run in parallel, thereby ensuring scalability
to large graphs. GraphSAC is tested under different anomaly
generation models based on random walks, clustered anomalies,
as well as contemporary adversarial attacks for graph data.
Experiments with real-world graphs showcase the advantage of
GraphSAC relative to state-of-the-art alternatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-expanding interconnection of social, email, and
media service platforms presents an opportunity for adversaries
manipulating networked data to launch malicious attacks [1],
[2], [3], [4]. Adversarially perturbed or simply anomalous graph
data may disrupt the operation of critical machine learning
algorithms with severe consequences. Detecting anomalies in
graph data is of major importance in a number of contemporary
applications such as flagging “fake news,” unveiling malicious
users in social networks, blocking spamming users in email
networks, and uncovering suspicious transactions in financial
or e-commerce networks [5], [6]. Detecting these anomalous
nodes can be formulated as a learning task over an attributed
graph.
Before positioning our work in context, we highlight dif-
ferent types of graph-based anomalies. Homophilic anomalies
characterize nodes whose attributes are dissimilar to those of
their neighbors [7], [8]. These nodes violate the homophily
property that postulates neighboring vertices to have similar
attributes, and is heavily employed in semi-supervised learning
(SSL) [9], [10], [11], [12]. In a social network of voters for
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example, friends typically belong to the same voting party; see
Fig. 1a. Oftentimes, anomalous nodes may form dense con-
nections giving rise to clustered homophilic anomalies Fig. 1b.
Structural anomalies correspond to nodes with attributes that
are dissimilar to structurally similar nodes [13]. Structural
similarity among nodes suggests that vertices involved in similar
graph structural patterns possess related attributes [14]. In
an academic collaboration network for instance, nodes with
similar graph structure (central nodes) have similar labels (e.g.,
professors); see Fig. 1c.
A. Related Work
Todays era of data deluge has grown the interest for detecting
anomalies in collections of high-dimensional data [15], [16].
This paper deals with anomalies in data that exhibit inter-
dependencies captured by a graph [5]. The inaccessibility
and prohibitive cost associated with obtaining ground-truth
anomalies motivates the development of mainly unsupervised
techniques.
Methods for detecting anomalies in attributed graphs can
be roughly classified in three categories. Community-based
approaches find clusters of nodes and search for anomalies
within each cluster. A probabilistic method is developed in
[17] that jointly discovers communities, and detects community
outliers as anomalies. Similarly, [7] identifies anomalies by
measuring the attribute correlation of nodes within each node’s
egonet, meaning the subgraph induced by the node of interest,
its one-hop neighbors, and all their connections. Subspace-
based approaches focus on spotting anomalies in subspaces
extracted from the nodal features [18]. On the other hand,
model-based methods learn an embedding per node and flag
anomalies by measuring the model-fitting error [19], [20]. A
parametric model is developed in [19] to capture the coherence
among the attributes of nodes and their connectivity. A deep
graph autoencoder is advocated in [20] that fuses attributes
and connections to an embedding per node, and identifies
anomalies using the reconstruction error at the decoder side.
Despite their empirical success, these contemporary approaches
are confronted with a number of challenges. The computational
overhead associated with community detection, subspace
extraction and deep learning, discourages their applicability
to large-scale graphs. The local scope of community-based
methods confines the breadth of the anomaly detector that is
further vulnerable to clusters of connected anomalous nodes.
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2(a) Social network of voters. (b) Clustered anomalies. (c) Academic network.
Fig. 1: Nodes in dotted square exhibit (a) (b) homophilic and (c) structural anomalies.
Finally, all aforementioned approaches ultimately learn an
anomaly score that relies on attributes and connections of all
nodes. However, either the attributes or the network links for
some nodes may be compromised by adversaries [21], [22].
B. Contributions
Addressing the aforementioned challenges, we introduce a
graph random sampling and consensus (GraphSAC) framework
for detecting anomalous nodes on large graphs. Instead of
directly considering all nodes, our novel method samples
subsets of nodes, and relies on graph-aware criteria to ju-
diciously filter out subsets contaminated by anomalous nodes.
The “clean” sets are utilized by a SSL module that estimates
a nominal class distribution per node. The core intuition
behind GraphSAC is that attributes of anomalous nodes
will have poor predictive performance in a SSL task. The
contribution of this work is fourfold. i) A novel approach to
estimating a class distribution per node that is guaranteed to
be minimally affected by anomalous nodes; ii) A versatile
framework that adapts to different types of anomalies via an
application-specific SSL module (cf. Fig. 1); iii) Scalability
to large-scale graphs (complexity is linear in the number of
edges); and iv) experimental evidence confirming that the
novel graph anomaly detector outperforms state-of-the-art
approaches in identifying clusters of anomalous nodes, as well
as contemporary adversarial attacks on graph data.
II. GRAPH-BASED RANDOM SAMPLING AND CONSENSUS
Consider a graph G := {V, E}, where V :=
{n1, n2, . . . , nN} is the vertex set, and E the edge set of E
edges . The connectivity of G is described by an adjacency
matrix A ∈ RN×N , where [A]n,n′ > 0 if (n, n′) ∈ E . Each
node n ∈ V is associated with one or more scalar labels yn ∈
{1, . . . , C} that form the N ×C matrix Y := [y>1 , . . . ,y>N ]>
with [Y]n,c = 1, if yn = c, and 0 otherwise.
Given A and Y the goal in this paper is to detect K
anomalous nodes with indices in the set A := {n1, . . . , nK}.
Such nodes are expected to violate a certain property such as
homophily. To this end, we require a model that relates the
graph with the labels, and promotes the desired properties.
An immediate approach is to directly consider all nodal
labels and connections in a graph-based model. However, such
a holistic approach will be vulnerable to the inclusion of
anomalous nodes that will bias the learned model and poison
the anomaly detection framework.
Instead, our idea is to sample labels yn at random subsets
of nodes n ∈ L ⊂ V and prudently discard contaminated
Algorithm 1 GraphSAC
Input: f(·, ·), A, {yn}Nn=1, I, T, i← 0
1. while i < I do
2. Select L(i) at random
3. Estimate Pˆ
(i)
G = f(L(i)) and consensus set U∗
4. If |U∗|/N < T then δf (L(i)) = 0, otw. δf (L(i)) = 1
5. i← i+ 1
6. end while
7. Obtain PˆG as in (4)
8. Obtain anomaly scores {φn}Nn=1 as in (5)
subsets. Given L, we perform SSL to predict the labels across
all nodes. SSL methods utilize the labels at L along with the
graph connectivity A to predict the labels at the unlabeled
nodes V \ L. We draw inspiration from the random sampling
approach for robust model fitting in image analysis [23]. The
SSL model f(·) utilizes the labels in L to estimate the N ×C
label distribution matrix as follows
Pˆ = f({yn}n∈L,A) (1)
where Pˆ(n,c) ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as the probability that
yn = c. Henceforth, for notation brevity we define the SSL
model as follows f(L) := f({yn}n∈L,A). The choice of f(·)
is dictated by specific properties one may want to capture; see
also Fig. 1.
Nevertheless, if L ∩A 6= ∅, the predicted label distributions
will be affected by the anomalous nodes. To bypass this hurdle,
we formulate a hypotheses test to assess if anomalies are
present in L by evaluating the predictive SSL performance
instantiated with L, namely f(L). Our test relies on the premise
that attributes of anomalous nodes will have poor predictive
performance for SSL.
Our iterative algorithm termed GraphSAC is summarized as
Algorithm 1. Per iteration i, we first sample S nodes uniformly
at random from V without replacement, that is
L(i) ∼ Unif(LS) (2)
where LS := {L ⊆ V : |L| = S} is the set of all S−size
subsets. Given the labels in L(i), the SSL model (1) outputs
the predicted label distribution matrix Pˆ
(i)
G := f(L(i)). Nodes
whose labels are correctly predicted by f(L(i)) form the consen-
sus set U∗ := {n : c′ = arg maxc [Pˆ(i)G ]n,c, and yn = c′}.
Next, GraphSAC compares the accuracy of f(L(i)) using
e.g., the ratio of nodes in the consensus set to a prespecified
threshold T . If |U∗|/N > T , GraphSAC decides that L(i) does
not contain anomalies, meaning δf (L(i)) = 1; otherwise, the
3set is contaminated with anomalies and filtered out, that is
δf (L(i)) = 0. The following test of hypotheses is performed{
H0 : δf (L(i)) = 1, if |U∗|/N > T
H1 : δf (L(i)) = 0, otherwise. (3)
Essentially, this test filters out subsets that are contaminated
with anomalies L ∩ A 6= ∅, and will bias the learned model.
Hence, δf (·) corresponds to a filter that aims to retain only
“clean” sets i.e. L∩A = ∅. We will elaborate on the performance
of this filter in Section 3. The resulting sample average of the
nominal label distribution is given by
PˆG =
∑I
i=1 f(L(i))δf (L(i))∑I
i=1 δf (L(i))
. (4)
Even though L(i) are drawn uniformly at random (2), δf (·)
introduces a sampling bias towards “clean” subsets. Conse-
quently, PˆG is minimally affected by anomalous nodes and
represents the nominal class distribution.
Finally, we select as anomalous the nodes with the largest
distance between their nominal distribution and their actual
labels. GraphSAC estimates an N × 1 anomaly score vector
φ(PˆG) with entries
φn = dist(pˆGn ,yn), ∀n ∈ V (5)
where pˆGn is the n-th row of PˆG, pˆ
(i)
n is the n-th row of Pˆ
(i)
G ,
and dist(·, ·) is the cross-entropy loss Therefore, φn is larger if
n does not adhere to the graph-related properties promoted by
the SSL model. Hence, we rank the nodes in decreasing order
with respect to φn, and select the first K nodes as anomalous.
Fig 2 illustrates the GraphSAC operations.
Instead of using as many nodes as possible to obtain the
solution, GraphSAC relies on small sets of S nodes and SSL-
aided hypotheses testing to avoid subsets contaminated with
anomalous nodes. The small sample size (S  N ) enables
GraphSAC to remain operational even under adverse conditions
where K is relative large. GraphSAC’s robustness is justified
since only one “clean” L(i) is required for a valid PˆG (4).
The computational complexity of GraphSAC per i is dictated
by the label prediction step f(L) that scales linearly with
the number of edges O(E) for scalable SSL methods [24],
[25]. Further, since the draws L(i) are independent, each
GraphSAC iteration i can be readily parallelized, thereby
ensuring scalability to large-scale graphs.
Notice that so far f(·) is not specified. Hence, GraphSAC
may adapt to the pertinent type of anomalies (see Fig. 1) by
appropriately choosing the model f(·). Homophilic anomalies
for example, call for SSL methods e.g. diffusion-based clas-
sifiers [24], [25] or contemporary graph convolutional neural
networks (GCN)s [10]. On the other hand, structural anomalies
necessitate models that promote structural similarities among
nodes such as the work in [14].
III. ANALYTICAL GUARANTEES
This section strengthens our proposed randomized anomaly
detection framework with analytical guarantees. Towards
streamlining the analysis, we interpret the filter δf (·) as
introducing a sampling bias to the uniform sampling scheme
in (2) towards “clean” subsets.1 Specifically, is rewritten PˆG
as
PˆG :=
1
I
I∑
i=1
f(L(i)) (6)
where L(i) ∼ pG(L) are drawn from the GraphSAC biased
sampling scheme instead of (2) with
pG(L) =
{
pd(L), ∀L ∈ L¯S
pf (L), ∀L ∈ L¯cS
(7)
where L¯S is a set of nodal subsets with no anomalous nodes
L¯S := {L ⊆ LS ,L ∩ A = ∅}, while the complementary set
L¯cS contains all the remaining size-S subsets L¯cS := LS \ L¯S .
Hence, pG(L) is related to the filter (3) through
pd(L) = p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ L¯S)p(L ∈ L¯S) (8)
pf (L) = p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ L¯cS)p(L ∈ L¯cS)
where p(L ∈ L¯S) = |L¯S |/|LS | and p(L ∈ L¯cS) = |L¯cS |/|LS |
in accordance with the uniform sampling (2). Notice that for
this section all I samples are included in the sample average
(6), but if the sample is contaminated, i.e. L ∈ L¯cS , L will have
a smaller probability to be sampled. GraphSAC aims at a class
distribution per node that is not affected by the anomalous
nodes, but takes into account only the nominal nodes, and
can thus be readily utilized for anomaly detection. Hence, the
desired probability matrix is
PN := EL∼pN [f(L)] (9)
where L are drawn uniformly from L¯S that is
pN (L) =
{
1
|L¯S | , ∀L ∈ L¯S
0, ∀L ∈ L¯cS .
(10)
Indeed, PN captures the nominal class distribution per node
that is not affected by the anomalous nodes and conforms to
the properties promoted by the SSL model. As a result, the
largest entries in the anomaly score vector φ(PN ) (cf. (5))
represent the anomalous nodes.
However, direct estimation of PN is not feasible since A is
unknown. If on the other hand all nodes are directly accounted
for, anomalous ones will be included that will in turn bias the
learned probability matrix. To obviate this hurdle, GraphSAC
introduces (3) to filter out contaminated subsets, giving rise to
the biased sampler in (7). GraphSAC’s ultimate target is the
expected probability matrix
PG := EL∼pG [f(L)]. (11)
Upon considering pf (L) = 0, ∀L ∈ L¯cS and pd(L) =
1/|L¯S |, ∀L ∈ L¯S , as well as expanding the expectation in
(11) and (9), GraphSAC’s expected probability matrix reduces
to the desired one, meaning PG = PN . This corresponds
to a perfect filter in (3) that disregards all contaminated
subsets δf (L) = 0,∀L ∈ L¯cS , and retains all the clean ones
δf (L) = 1,∀L ∈ L¯S .
1An alternative analysis accounting directly for δf (·) is in Section D of the
supplementary material.
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Fig. 2: An illustration of the operation of GraphSAC. The first row represents the available graph and labels. The second row
shows the sampled labels. The third row contains the SSL module that outputs the predicted labels, where green dotted lines
indicate incorrectly classified nodes. The filter in the fifth row decides whether L(i) contains anomalies or not. The predictions
with a larger number of missclasified nodes are discarded (colored red). The final anomalies are detected by combining the
predictions from the “clean” subsets.
Thus, GraphSAC’s performance is directly related to the
distance among PˆG and PN
TV(PˆG,PN ) := ‖PˆG −PN‖1 (12)
≤ ‖PG −PN‖1 + ‖PˆG −PG‖1 (13)
where (13) follows from the triangle inequality, and ‖Z‖1
represents the sum of the absolute values of the Z entries.
Adhering to (13), the following research questions have to be
addressed to characterize the performance of GraphSAC.
RQ1. How ‖PG −PN‖1 relates to the filter performance? and
RQ2. How ‖PˆG − PG‖1 evolves as the number of draws I
increases?
The following analysis aspires to provide tangible answers to
aforementioned questions. First, consider a simplified version
of pG(L) given by
pG(L) =
{
d, ∀L ∈ L¯S
f, ∀L ∈ L¯cS .
(14)
which implies that any clean (contaminated) subset in L¯S (L¯cS)
has the same sampling probability d (f ). This approximation
suggests that GraphSAC samples all contaminated samples
with a certain probability, and all non-contaminated with a
different one (cf. (8)). Extended analysis on a refined sampling
scheme different from (14) is included in Section D of the
supplementary material, e.g. if a subset contains a large number
of anomalies, the probability this sample is rejected is higher
relative to a sample with only one anomaly.
Theorem 1. (Proof in Section A of the supplementary material.)
Let PA := EL∼Unif(L¯cS)
[
f(L)] denote the expected distribution
when anomalies are sampled. It then holds for the total
variation distance between PG and PN that
‖PG −PN‖1 = |L¯
c
S |2
|LS | pfa‖PA −PN |d1 (15)
=|L¯cS |f‖PA −PN |d1 (16)
where pfa := p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ L¯cS) is the probability of
false alarms for (3) that can be also expressed as pfa =
(|LS |/|L¯cS |)f with |L¯cS | =
(
N
S
)− (N−KS ) and |LS | = (NS).
Theorem 1 asserts that the desired distance is equal to the
distance between the nominal distribution and the one affected
by the anomalies scaled by the probability that GraphSAC
fails to identify the anomalies. An immediate observation is
that for a perfect GraphSAC filter it holds that pfa = 0,
and one would obtain the desired PG = PN . Another
consequence of Theorem 1, is that as the number of anomalies
K increases, so does |L¯cS | and ‖PG−PN‖1, conditioned that
the filter performance does not change. As demonstrated in
the experiments, even if anomalous subsets are miss-classified
as nominal by the filter for a specific draw, these will contain
a small number of anomalies and will not affect the overall
anomaly detection performance.
Towards addressing Q2 we utilize concentration inequalities
theory applied to random matrices [26] and establish the
following.
Theorem 2. (Proof in Section B of the supplementary material.)
With PˆG = 1I
∑I
i=1P
(i)
G , where P
(i)
G = f(L(i)) and PG =
EL∼pG [f(L)], it holds that
E
{‖PˆG −PG‖} ≤√2N log(N + C)
I
+
2
√
N log(N + C)
3I
(17)
5and for all t > 0
P
{‖PˆG −PG‖ ≥ t} ≤ (N + C) exp( −It2
N + 2
√
Nt/3
)
.
(18)
All the parameters in the right hand side of (17) and (18)
are either known or controllable, and relate to the network size
N and the number of classes C. The expectation bound (17)
suggests that by increasing the number of draws I the sample
average of the random matrices will approach the desired
ensemble mean. On the other hand, (18) bounds the tail of the
probability distribution of the difference. It can be shown that
for t ≤ √N the tail probability decays as fast as the tail of
a Gaussian random variable with variance proportional to N ,
while for t ≥ √N it decays as that of an exponential random
variable whose mean is proportional to
√
N .
Retracing back to (13), we deduce that ‖PˆG − PG‖1
decreases for increasing I , whereas ‖PN − PG‖1 directly
depends on the filter performance. In practice, GraphSAC
amounts to ranking the per-node anomaly scores. This ranking
may be evident even for relative large distances ‖PˆG −PN‖1.
A. Analysis on diffusion-based SSL models
The results presented so far hold for any SSL model even for
contemporary GCNs. Next, we focus on the class of diffusion-
based SSL models fdif, which have documented success in
sizable graphs due to their scalability and robustness [24], [25].
Most of these models can be written as
fdif(L) = h(A)YL (19)
where h is e.g. a polynomial function, and YL is an N × C
matrix whose n-th row is yn if n ∈ L, and 0C otherwise. A
common choice is h(A) =
∑T
t=0 αt(D
−1/2AD−1/2)t, where
αt > 0 and D = diag(A1) denotes the degree matrix.
Corollary 1. (Proof in Section C of the supplementary
material.) Let fdif(L) = h(A)YL with h(A) = [h1, . . . ,hN ]
be the diffusion matrix, and N := V − A the set containing
the nominal nodes. The total variation distance between PG
and PN is
‖PG −PN‖1 = pfa fA|L¯cS |
∥∥∥∥ KN−K ∑
n∈N
hny
>
n −
∑
n′∈A
hn′y
>
n′
∥∥∥∥
1
(20)
where fA :=
(
N−1
S−1
)
and |L¯cS | =
(
N
S
)− (N−KS ).
Upon applying the reverse triangle inequality to (20),
Corollary 1 yields
‖PN −PA‖1 ≥ fA|L¯cS |
∣∣∣∣‖∑
n′∈A
hn′y
>
n′‖1 − KN−K ‖
∑
n∈N
hny
>
n ‖1
∣∣∣∣
= fA|L¯cS |
∣∣∣∣ ∑
n′∈A
‖hn′‖1 − KN−K
∑
n∈N
‖hn‖1
∣∣∣∣
(21)
where (21) follows since yn has entries either 0 or 1, and hn
has nonegative entries. Hence, anomalous nodes with large
‖hn‖1 contribute more to the error norm ‖PN − PG‖1. In
TABLE I: AUC values for detecting adversarial attacks.
Dataset Citeseer Polblog Cora Pubmed
GraphSAC 0.75 0.98 0.80 0.82
Gae 0.64 0.51 0.50 0.69
Amen 0.73 0.89 0.75 0.62
Radar 0.67 0.76 0.77 0.44
Degree 0.58 0.48 0.40 0.57
Cut ratio 0.49 0.51 0.35 0.55
Flake 0.47 0.61 0.46 0.60
Conductance 0.35 0.39 0.61 0.59
diffusion-based models, nodes with larger ‖hn‖1 typically have
higher degree. Consequently, as expected anomalous nodes with
high degree have a large effect on the learned distributions.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we compare GraphSAC with state-of-the-art
alternatives under different anomaly generation models based
on random walks, clustered anomalies, as well as contemporary
adversarial attacks for graph data.
Baselines. Amen identifies anomalies by evaluating the at-
tribute correlation of nodes per egonet of the graph [7]. The
graph neural network encoder (GAE) ranks anomalies by
measuring the reconstruction error recovered at the decoder
output [20]. Radar asserts nodes as anomalous if they do not
adhere to the proposed parametric model [19]. Following the
experimental setup in [7], additional anomaly detection methods
are considered that only utilize graph connectivity but not nodal
labels, namely approaches based on the Average degree [27],
Cut ratio [28], Flake [29], and Conductance [30]. Unless stated
otherwise, GraphSAC is configured with T = 0.5, I = 50 and
the personalized PageRank (PPR) [31] as the SSL model. The
different methods are evaluated using the area under the curve
(AUC) of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
The ROC curve plots the rate an anomaly is detected (true
positive) against the rate a node is miss-classified as anomalous
(false positive). The AUC value represents the probability that
a randomly chosen abnormal node is ranked higher than a
normal node.
Datasets. The 7 benchmark labeled graphs are Cora (N =
2708, C = 7), Citeseer (N = 3327, C = 6), Pubmed (N =
19717, C = 3), Polblogs (N = 1224, C = 2), Blogcat (N =
10312, C = 39), PPI (N = 3890, C = 50), and Wikipedia
(N = 4733, C = 39). The nodes in the last three graphs are
multilabel ones.2
A. Adversarial attacks
We generated anomalies using the adversarial setup in [21],
where attacks are effected on attributed graphs targeted for
GCNs. We focus on structural attacks, which means that edges
adjacent to the targeted node are added or removed; that is,
we select a random subset of targeted nodes A, and alter their
connectivity by a sequence of structural attacks [21].
2For graphs with multilabeled nodes, clustered anomalies and adversarial
attacks are not defined and hence, these graphs are not included in the
respecitive experiments.
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Fig. 3: AUC values for increasing number of anomalies |A| = K. (Top left) Pubmed, (Top middle left) Cora, (Top middle
right) Citeseer, (Top right) Polblogs, (Bottom left) Blogcat, (Bottom middle) Wikipedia (Bottom right) PPI.
Table I reports the AUC values for competing state-of-the-art
techniques in detecting adversarial attacks with K=10 targeted
nodes. As GAE relies on a deep graph autonencoder [20], it
is maximally affected by the adversarial attacks. Our novel
method outperforms all alternatives in detecting the attacked
nodes. These promising results suggest that GraphSAC can be
effectively employed as a preprocessing step to flag adversarial
input to a graph neural network.
B. Random walk-based anomalies
We test the algorithms in identifying homophilic random-
walk based anomalies. To generate these we select a subset of
|A| nodes at random, and alter their labels. For each n ∈ A,
we perform a random walk of length k = 10, and replace yn
with the label of the landing node. Hence, we modify the labels
of the targeted nodes in A as prescribed by the random walk
model. The resulting nodes violate the homophily property.
Fig. 3 plots the AUC values of various methods with
increasing K on 6 benchmark graphs. Evidently, GraphSAC
outperforms alternatives while the performance of all methods
degrades slightly as K increases. Furthermore, Fig. 4 reports
the runtime of the best performing algorithms for K = 20 in
Fig. 3 across all graphs. Evidently, GraphSAC is significantly
faster than these competing methods. For further details on
these runtime comparisons see Section E of the supplementary
material.
C. Clustered anomalies
Next, we consider indentifying clusters of anomalous nodes
Fig.1b. Towards generating clustered anomalies, we select a
cluster of connected nodes A using [32], and set all labels
as yn = c,∀n ∈ A, where c is the least common label in A.
The anomalous nodes satisfy the homophily property inside
the corrupted cluster that further challenges their detection.
Table II reports the AUC values of anomaly detection algo-
rithms for identifying clustered anomalies. The performance
TABLE II: AUC values for discovering clusters of anomalous
nodes.
Dataset Citeseer Polblog Cora Pubmed
GraphSAC 0.88 0.74 0.97 0.96
Gae 0.50 0.30 0.58 0.95
Amen 0.51 0.10 0.48 0.42
Radar 0.86 0.40 0.88 0.88
Degree 0.46 0.10 0.45 0.29
Cut ratio 0.49 0.08 0.40 0.27
Flake 0.40 0.05 0.37 0.33
Conductance 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.37
of competing algorithms is heavily affected since within the
affected cluster the anomalous nodes appear as nominal. On the
other hand, our novel approach utilizes random sampling and
consensus strategies, and markedly outperforms the baseline
schemes in identifying the ground-truth anomalies.
Parameter sensitivity. Sensitivity of GraphSAC to I, T is
reported in Fig. 5. GraphSAC’s AUC performance is stable
around the preselected values. As deduced in the discussion
after Theorem 2, the number of iterations I for a reliable
anomaly score ranking is relatively small. A large enough ratio
of correctly classified nodes T , aides GraphSAC in discarding
contaminated samples since these will result in a large number
of miss-classified nodes.
Additional SSL methods. Fig. 6 reports the AUC for Graph-
SAC when using the personalized page-rank (ppr) [31] and
heat-kernel (hk) [12] SSL methods for the experiment in Fig. 3.
Deep SSL methods [10] for GraphSAC will be part of our
future research.
On the practical interpretation of Theorem 1. Fig. 7a reports
the AUC performance of GraphSAC for Citeseer in Fig. 3
with varying number of anomalies K and sampling size S,
where darker boxes indicate larger values of AUC. Observe
that the AUC increases for larger S. For larger K the AUC
drops as expected, but this can be rectified by increasing
S. Fig. 7b demonstrates the maximum number of anomalies
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Fig. 4: Runtime comparisons across different graphs for Fig. 3.
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Fig. 5: GraphSAC’s sensitivity to I, T for the Citeseer dataset
with K = 80 in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 6: Citeseer with additional SSL methods.
Km := maxiK
(i) that existed in the contaminated samples
that were missclasiffied as nominal δ(f(L(i))) = 1, where
K(i) := |L(i)∪A|. Notice Km in Fig. 7b is significantly smaller
than the total number of anomalies that is K = 17, 33, 83,
respectively. Hence, even though there are contaminated
samples, the number anomalies in L is so small that does
not affect the AUC values in Fig. 7a. Motivated by this result,
we derive a stronger version of Theorem 1 that accounts for
Km and is included in Section D of the supplementary material.
(a) AUC values for detecting the
anomalous nodes.
(b) Maximum number of anoma-
lies in missed L(i)
Fig. 7: X-axis denotes the fraction of samples S/N and y-axis
represents the fraction of anomalies K/N .
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced a graph-based random sampling and con-
sensus approach to effectively detect anomalous nodes in
large-scale graphs. Rigorous analysis provides performance
guarantees for our novel algorithm, by bounding the number
of random draws involved. GraphSAC outperforms competing
algorithms in detecting random walk-based anomalies, clustered
anomalies, as well as contemporary adversarial attacks for
graph data. Our future research will leverage GraphSAC to
guard semi-supervised learning algorithms from adversarial
attacks.
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APPENDIX
9GraphSAC: Detecting anomalies in large-scale graphs
Supplementary material First,
a link between the GraphSAC sampling scheme (7) and the GraphSAC filter (3) is established.3 Using the law of total probability (l.t.p), the
total probability of sampling any contaminated subset is ∑
L∈L¯c
S
pG(L) = |L¯cS |f. (22)
This probability coincides with (3), the probability of declaring all contaminated samples as clean. Using the l.t.p. and the uniform sampling
strategy of (2) it holds that ∑
L∈L¯c
S
p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ L¯cS)p(L ∈ L¯cS) = |L¯cS |p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ L¯cS)p(L ∈ L¯cS) (23)
where p(L ∈ L¯cS) = |L¯cS |/|LS | due to the uniform sampling (2). By introducing the probability of false alarm for (3) as pfa := p(δf (L) =
1|L ∈ L¯cS) and equating the right side in (22) and (23) it holds that
pfa :=
|LS |
|L¯cS |
f (24)
Next, using the l.t.p. it holds for pg(L) (14) that
1 = |L¯S |d+ |L¯cS |f (25)
d =
1− |L¯cS |f
|L¯S | (26)
Furthermore by the definition of PG, it follows that
PG =EL∼pG [f(L)] (27)
=
∑
L∈LS
pg(L)f(L) (28)
=
∑
L∈L¯S
f(L)d+
∑
L′∈L¯c
S
f(L′)f (29)
=d|L¯S |PN + f |L¯cS |PA (30)
where (29) holds since L¯S and L¯cS are disjoint subsets, (30) follows by definition of PN = 1/|L¯S |
∑
L∈L¯S f(L) and PA =
1/|L¯cS |
∑
L′∈L¯c
S
f(L′). Using (25) and (24) it holds that
PG = (1− |L¯
c
S |2
|LS | pfa)PN +
|L¯cS |2
|LS | pfaPA. (31)
Hence, PG is a convex combination between the nominal label distribution PN and the one affected by the anomalies PA. By using (31)
the result of Theorem 1 follows
‖PG −PN‖1 = |L¯
c
S |2
|LS | pfa‖PA −PN‖1. (32)
For the cardinality of the involved sets of subsets counting theory will be used. Specifically, it follows
|L¯S | =
(
N −K
S
)
(33)
since this is the number of ways to choose S nodes out of N −K. Similarly, by counting the subsets with size S constructed out of N
nodes it holds that
|LS | =
(
N
S
)
. (34)
Finally, since the subsets L¯cS and L¯S are not overlapping it holds that |L¯cS | = |LS | − |L¯S | and
|L¯cS | =
(
N
S
)
−
(
N −K
S
)
. (35)
In this section ‖P‖1 represents the norm 1 of matrix P, and not the sum of absolute values of the elements of P. Notice that since each
draw of nodes L(i) is independent, P(i)G is also independent across i. For each P(i)G it further holds
‖P(i)G ‖ ≤
√
‖P(i)G ‖1‖P(i)G ‖∞ ≤
√
N (36)
3Equations (k) with k ≤ 21 correspond to the orginal manuscript while (k) with k > 21 correspond to the supplementary material).
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where the last inequality follows since [P(i)G ]n,c ∈ [0, 1], ∀n, c and
∑C
c=1[P
(i)
G ]n,c = 1, ∀n that implies ‖P(i)G ‖1 ≤ 1 and ‖P(i)G ‖∞ ≤ N .
Next, the second moment of the matrix P(i)G is also bounded
m2(P
(i)
G ) = max
[‖E{P(i)G P(i)G >}‖, ‖E{P(i)G >P(i)G }‖]. (37)
Let us define M = E{P(i)G P(i)G
>}. For the spectral norm it holds that
‖M‖ ≤
√
‖M‖∞‖M‖1 ≤ N (38)
where the last inequality holds since M(n,n′) = E{
∑C
k=1[P
(i)
G ]n,c[P
(i)
G ]n′,c} ≤ 1 since [P(i)G ]n,c ∈ [0, 1], ∀n, c and
∑C
c=1[P
(i)
G ]n,c = 1, ∀n,
and thus ‖M‖∞ ≤ N and ‖M‖1 ≤ N . Similarly, it can be shown that ‖E{Pˆ>GPˆG}‖ ≤ N . Furthermore, the matrix variance is bounded as
v(PˆG) ≤ N (39)
Hence, by appealing to the matrix Bernstein inequality for the sum of uncentered random matrices [26, Ch. 6] (17) and (18) in Theorem 2
follow. For the following consider that YL is an N ×C matrix whose n-th row is y>n if n ∈ L and is 0>C otherwise. First, for diffusion-based
SSL models it holds that
‖PN −PA‖1 = ‖h(A)( 1|L¯S |
∑
L∈L¯S
YL − 1|L¯cS |
∑
L′∈L¯c
S
YL′)‖1 (40)
If n ∈ N is nominal node, where N = V −A, then n is contained in (N−K−1
S−1
)
subsets of L¯S since n may participate in a subset of size
S − 1 with any of the N −K − 1 remaining nominal nodes. Hence, each row n of Y in the first sum of (40) is added (N−K−1
S−1
)
times if
n ∈ N and 0 if n ∈ A. Hence, it follows
1
|L¯S |
∑
L∈L¯S
YL =
(
N−K−1
S−1
)(
N−K
S
) YN (41)
=
S
N −KYN (42)
For an anomalous node, n ∈ A is contained in fA :=
(
N−1
S−1
)
subsets of L¯cS since n may participate in a subset of size S − 1 with any of
the N − 1 remaining nodes. On the contrary, for a nominal node n ∈ N , the number of times fN , n appears in subsets of L¯cS can not be
computed with straightforward counting theory, since any subset containing n must contain at least one anomalous node. However, the total
number of nodes in all subsets of L¯cS is expressed as
S|L¯cS | = KfA + (N −K)fN (43)
where the left side of (43) follows since there are |L¯cS | subsets each containing S nodes and the right side of (43) holds since there are
K(N −K) anomalous (nominal) nodes each included in fA(fN ) subsets of L¯cS . Hence, it holds that
fN =
S
N −K |L¯
c
S | − K
N −KfA. (44)
Hence, the n-th row of Y in the second sum of (40) is added fA times if n ∈ A and fN times if n ∈ N . Thus, it follows
1
|L¯cS |
∑
L′∈L¯c
S
YL′ =
fN
|L¯cS |
YN +
fA
|L¯cS |
YA (45)
By utilizing (42) and (45) it holds that
1
|L¯S |
∑
L∈L¯S
YL − 1|L¯cS |
∑
L′∈L¯c
S
YL′ =
S
N −KYN −
fN
|L¯cS |
YN − fA|L¯cS |
YA (46)
=
KfA
|L¯cS |(N −K)
YN − fA|L¯cS |
YA (47)
=
fA
|L¯cS |
(
K
N −KYN −YA
)
(48)
Hence, for diffusion-based SSL models it holds that
‖PN −PA‖1 = ‖ fA|L¯cS |
h(A)
(
K
N −KYN −YA
)
‖1 (49)
Furthermore, using canonical vectors YN is written as
YN =
∑
n∈N
eny
>
n (50)
where en is a canonical vector with 1 at the n-th position and otherwise 0. Hence, if hn is the n-th column of h(A) it follows from (49) that
‖PN −PA‖1 = fA|L¯cS |
‖ K
N −K
∑
n∈N
hny
>
n −
∑
n∈A
hny
>
n ‖1. (51)
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This section provides alternative guarantees that directly account for δf (·) in the analysis. The ultimate goal of GraphSAC is to obtain a
class distribution per node that is not affected by the anomalous nodes but takes into account only the nominal nodes. Hence, the desired
probability matrix is
PN := EL¯[f(L¯)] (52)
where L¯ are drawn uniformly L¯ ∼ Unif(L¯S) from the set of “clean” S−size nodal subsets
L¯S := {L ⊆ V : |L| = S,L ∩ A = ∅} (53)
Indeed, PN captures the nominal class distribution per node that is not affected by the anomalous nodes and conforms to the properties
promoted by the SSL model. Therefore, the largest entries in the anomaly score vector φ(PN ) represent the anomalous nodes .
Unfortunately, direct estimation of PN is not feasible since A is unknown. Further, note that if one directly accounts for all nodes will
eventually include anomalous nodes that will bias the learned probability matrix. On the other hand, GraphSAC builds incrementally an
expected probability distribution using only samples that are minimally affected by anomalies.
GraphSAC decides if a sample is contaminated with anomalies by evaluating the accuracy of the instantiated SSL model (3). If δf (L(i)) = 1
then Pˆ(i)G is considered, and otherwise not. Ultimately, GraphSAC targets at the following expected probability matrix
PG :=
EL[f(L)δf (L)]
EL[δf (L)] (54)
where L is drawn uniformly from LS (2). If GraphSAC discards all the contaminated samples and maintains all the clean ones, then indeed
EL[δf (L)] = |L¯S |/|LS | and EL[f(L)δf (L)] =
∑
L∈L¯S f(L)/|LS | that amounts to PG = PN .
Hence, the distance among PG and the desired PN characterizes the performance of GraphSAC. Next, a couple of assumptions follow
that enable theoretical claims stronger than Theorem 1.4
1) GraphSAC will identify clean samples
δf (L) = 1 if L ∈ L¯S (55)
2) GraphSAC will identify contaminated samples if they contain at least Km + 1 anomalies
δf (L) = 0 if |L ∩ A| ≥ Km + 1 (56)
The first assumption declares that sets with no anomalies will be labeled correctly, i.e. p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ L¯S) = 1. This can be satisfied
by the required accuracy T of Algorithm 1 low enough.
The second assumption asserts that GraphSAC will filter out a contaminated set if enough anomalies are in the sample. This is not
surprising since a large number of anomalies in L will result to a small consensus set |U∗| and L will be discarded. Thus, the probability of
false alarm is
pfa :=p(δf (L) = 1|L /∈ L¯S)
=p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ LKmS ) (57)
where LKmS is the set of subsets containing at least one and at most Km anomalies, i.e. LKmS := {L ⊆ V : |L| = S, 1 ≤ |L ∩ A| ≤ Km}.
Theorem 3. Let PA := EL
[
f(L)∣∣δf (L) = 1,L ∈ LKmS ] be the expected distribution obtained from f(·) given that at most Km anomalies
are sampled and the filter declares the sample as clean, pLKm
S
:= p(L ∈ LKmS ), and pL¯S := p(L ∈ L¯S). The total variation distance
between PG and PN is bounded as
TV(PG,PN ) = ‖PG −PN‖1 = pfa
pL¯S + pfa(1− pL¯S )
‖PApLKm
S
−PN (1− pL¯S )‖1. (58)
Proof. First, by the law of total probability, EL[f(L)δf (L)] is written as
EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
]
= EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
∣∣L ∈ L¯S]pL¯S + EL[f(L)δf (L)∣∣L /∈ L¯S](1− pL¯S ) (59)
where pL¯S := p(L ∈ L¯S). Next, by applying (55) it holds that
EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
∣∣L ∈ L¯S] = EL¯(f(L¯)) = PN . (60)
Furthermore, by using (56) it follows that
EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
∣∣L /∈ L¯S] = EL[f(L)δf (L)∣∣L ∈ LKmS ]p(L ∈ LKmS ∣∣L /∈ L¯S) (61)
The equality in (61) implies that GraphSAC always filters out samples corrupted with at least Km + 1 adversaries. Hence, by using (60) and
(61), it follows from (59) that
EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
]
= PNpL¯S + EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
∣∣L ∈ LKmS ]pLKm
S
(62)
where pLKm
S
= p(L ∈ LKmS
∣∣L /∈ L¯S)(1 − pL¯S ) = p(L ∈ LKmS ). Furthermore, since PG = EL[f(L)δf (L)]/EL[δf (L)] with pδ :=
EL[δf (L)] it holds that
‖PG −PN‖1 = ‖ 1
pδ
(
PNpL¯S + EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
∣∣L ∈ LKmS ]pLKm
S
)−PN‖1 (63)
= ‖EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
∣∣L ∈ LKmS ]pLKmSpδ −PN pδ − pL¯Spδ ‖1 (64)
4Both assumption have been verified to hold empirically in simulation (See Fig. 10)
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Fig. 8: Runtime comparisons across different graphs for Fig. 3.
Fig. 9: Clustered anomalies.
Furthermore, using the law of total probability it holds that
EL
[
f(L)δf (L)
∣∣L ∈ LKmS ] = EL[f(L)∣∣δf (L) = 1,L ∈ LKmS ]p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ LKmS ) (65)
= PApfa (66)
where pfa = p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ LKmS ) and PA = EL
[
f(L)∣∣δf (L) = 1,L ∈ LKmS ]. Following a similar argument it holds for pδ that
pδ =p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ L¯S)pL¯S + p(δf (L) = 1|L /∈ L¯S)(1− pL¯S ) (67)
=pL¯S + p(δf (L) = 1|L ∈ LKmS )(1− pL¯S ) (68)
=pL¯S + pfa(1− pL¯S ) (69)
where (67) follows from the law of total probability and (68) is a result of applying (55) and (56). Hence, the result in Theorem 3 is
established as follows
‖PG −PN‖1 = ‖PA
pfapLKm
S
pL¯S + pfa(1− pL¯S )
−PN
pfa(1− pL¯S ))
pL¯S + pfa(1− pL¯S )
‖1 (70)
=
pfa
pL¯S + pfa(1− pL¯S )
‖PApLKm
S
−PN (1− pL¯S )‖1 (71)
Theorem 3 states that the distance between the desired and the pursed distribution is bounded by the scaled distance between the nominal
distribution and the one affected by the anomalies. Different than Theorem 1 in the main document, Theorem 3, utilizes two additional
(experimentally verified) assumptions, and provides a finer representation of ‖PG −PN‖1.
This section reports the runtime performance of the algorithms in Fig. 3 in the main document. The scalabilty of GraphSAC is reflected on
the runtime comparisons listed in Fig. 8. Fig. 8 reports the runtime per algorithm for K = 20 in Fig. 3. All experiments were run on a
machine with i7-4790 @3.60 Ghz CPU, and 32GB of RAM. We used the Matlab and Python implementations provided by the authors of the
compared algorithms. For fair comparison, the iterative version of Algorithm 1 is employed, even though the algorithm can be performed in
parallel per i.
GraphSAC employs efficient SSL solvers, and as expected is orders of magnitude faster than the competing anomaly detection approaches.
The computational overhead associated with scoring each egonet [7], subspace extraction [19] and deep neural networks [20] limits the
applicability of Amen [7], Radar [19], Gae [20], respectively to large-scale graphs.
This section provides additional experiments that characterize the performance of GraphSAC. Anomaly detection is tested under the
structural anomaly generation model based on random walks. Furthermore, assumptions 1,2 of Theorem 3 are examined experimentally.
Finally, the anomaly detection performance of GraphSAC is tested under varying the number of anomalies K and the size of the sample set S.
Baselines. See Section 4 in the main document.
Random walk-based structural anomalies. First, a subset of |A| nodes is selected at random. For each n ∈ A, a random walk of length
k is performed and n is connected to the landing node. This process is repeated I times per node n that results to at most I new connections
to node n.
Table III reports the AUC values for detecting random walk-based structural anomalies with I = 5. The performance of the majority of the
methods improves as k increases. This is expected since, for larger length of the random walks k, the landing node will be increasingly
13
TABLE III: Discover anomalous nodes with |A| = 20 for the Polblogs dataset.
Length of RW k = 5 k = 10 k = 20 k = 30
GraphSAC 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.91
Amen 0.39 0.42 0.55 0.60
Radar 0.68 0.71 0.67 0.70
Avg degree 0.68 0.67 0.53 0.51
Cut ratio 0.49 0.56 0.53 0.49
Flake 0.53 0.49 0.55 0.49
Conductance 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16
dissimilar to the starting node and hence the structural anomaly will be easier identified. For all values of k GraphSAC outperforms the
competing approaches.
On the dependence of GraphSAC to K and S. Random walk-based label anomalies for the Citesser dataset are generated as in Section
4 of the main document. GraphSAC uses I = 2000 iterations and the accuracy threshold is T = 0.6.
Fig. 10c reports the AUC performance of GraphSAC for varying K and S, where darker boxes indicate larger values. Observe that as S
increases the AUC increases as well. Although an increase on the number of anomalies K decreases the performance in AUC, this can be
rectified by an increase in the sampling size S.
Fig. 10a represents pc := 1 − pfa the percentage of contaminated subsets L(i) that were discarded, which relates to assumption 1 of
Theorem 3. Hence, large values of pc represent small pfa and are desirable. For small S, pc is large and as S increases pc decreases. Further,
note that a small pc (large pfa) is not affecting the AUC performance. Even though there are contaminated samples, the number anomalies in
L is so small that does not affect the AUC values Fig. 7a.
Fig. 10b shows the maximum number of anomalies maxiK(i) that existed in the contaminated samples that were missclasiffied as nominal
δ(f(L(i))) = 1 where K(i) := |L(i) ∪ A|. This number is equivalent to Km in assumption 2. Notice that assumption 2 indeed holds here
since Km in Fig. 10b is much less than the total number of anomalies that is K = 17, 33, 83, 166, 266 respectively.
(a) Percentage of contaminated subsets L(i) discarded.
(b) Maximum number of anomalies in L(i), where δ(f(L(i))) = 1.
or Km
(c) AUC values for detecting the anomalous nodes.
Fig. 10: The horizontal axis represents the fraction of samples S/N and the vertical axis represents the fraction of anomalies
K/N , where both are normalized by the number of nodes.
